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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL T. BILANZICH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN LONETTI, an individual, EUNES 
I. LONETTI, an individual, and JDL 
HOLDINGS, L.C., 
Defendants/Appellees 
I. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)0) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court commit error in ruling that Plaintiff/Appellant Michael T. 
Bilanzich ("Bilanzich") is not entitled to recover his attorney's fees incurred in these 
consolidated actions under the Guaranty executed by Bilanzich and the Note that 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
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Bilanzich guaranteed on the basis that the court had previously held that the Guaranty was 
unenforceable because a condition precedent to Bilanzich's liability on the Guaranty had 
not occurred? This issue presents a question of law and the trial court's decision is 
reviewed for correctness. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 
1273, 1277 (Utah 1998). 
This issue was preserved below. [R. 2527-2536] 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 is determinative of this case. That statute provides: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails 
in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing executed after April 28, 1986 where the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to 
recover attorney's fees. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
This case arose out of the efforts of Reese's Enterprise, Inc. ("REI") to develop a 
motel near the entrance of Zions National Park and Bilanzich's execution of a Guaranty 
2 
of a Note executed by REI in favor of John and Eunes Lonetti (the "Lonettis") which was 
assigned to JDL Holdings, L.C. ("JDL") of which they are the sole members. 
Bilanzich commenced this action in August, 2000. [R. 1] Bilanzich's Second 
Amended Complaint asserted a claim for declaratory relief against the Lonettis and JDL 
that Bilanzich was not liable under the Guaranty because REI had never obtained a $3.5 
Million loan, which was a condition precedent to Bilanzich's liability on the Guaranty. 
Bilanzich also sought rescission of the Guaranty on that same basis and upon other 
grounds, including fraud, and asserted a claim for unjust enrichment. [R. 1306-1330] 
JDL filed a separate action against Bilanzich (the "JDL Action"), seeking to 
recover on the Guaranty. [R. 2499] The JDL Action was consolidated with the Bilanzich 
case. [R. 671] 
On August 15, 2003, Bilanzich filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
against the Lonettis and JDL both on JDL's complaint against Bilanzich on the Guaranty 
and on Bilanzich's declaratory relief claim. [R. 1725] Bilanzich contended that as a 
matter of law the Guaranty was not enforceable against Bilanzich because a condition 
precedent to Bilanzich's liability under the Guaranty was that REI obtain a $3.5 Million 
construction loan, which condition precedent had never occurred. [R. 1728-1739] The 
Lonettis and JDL opposed the partial summary judgment motion on the ground that 
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Bilanzich was not a party to the Term Sheet and that the Guaranty was unconditional. [R. 
2082-2090] 
On December 15, 2003, the trial court granted partial summary judgment, 
determining that the Guaranty was unenforceable because the condition precedent to 
Bilanzich's liability thereunder that REI would obtain the $3.5 Million construction loan 
had never occurred. [R. 2221-2223] The Lonettis and JDL have not appealed this 
decision. On March 9, 2004, pursuant to Rule 54(b), the district court entered final 
judgment in favor of Bilanzich on his declaratory relief claim and on JDL's claim against 
Bilanzich on the Guaranty. [R. 2424] Thereafter, Bilanzich agreed with the Lonettis and 
JDL to dismiss his rescission and unjust enrichment claims and the Lonettis agreed to 
waive their right to appeal the judgment. [R. 2409; 2421; 2435] 
Bilanzich filed a motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the 
Guaranty. [R. 2385] The Lonettis and JDL opposed the motion on the basis that: (1) 
Bilanzich was not a party to the Note; (2) the Guaranty supposedly did not contain an 
attorney's fee provision; (3) the claim for the attorney fees and costs was supposedly 
contrary to a settlement with the Lonettis and JDL (even though there was no agreement 
whatsoever to waive attorney's fees and costs); and (4) the amount claimed was not 
reasonable. [R. 2427-2438] 
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The court held a hearing on the attorney's fee motion on May 4, 2004. At the 
hearing, Judge Shumate stated that the Guaranty did in fact provide for attorney's fees. 
[R. 2248 at 2-3] However, Judge Shumate asked for supplemental briefing on the issue 
of whether the court could award attorney's fees when the court had already determined 
that the Guaranty was unenforceable against Bilanzich because the condition precedent 
had not occurred. [Id. at 5] The parties subsequently filed supplemental memoranda on 
this issue. [R. 2520; 2527] 
Judge Shumate issued a Minute Entry filed June 23, 2004, denying the motion for 
attorney's fees and striking the scheduled June 29, 2004 hearing. [R. 2560] Bilanzich 
filed a Notice of Appeal on July 7, 2004 and an Amended Notice of Appeal on July 14, 
2004. [R. 2562] 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant REI was developing a motel near the entrance to Zions National 
Park in Springdale, Utah. On December 31, 1996, the Lonettis made a loan to REI with 
respect to the project. REI executed a $1,780,600.00 Trust Deed Note (the "Note") in 
favor of the Lonettis and a Deed of Trust encumbering the motel property as security for 
repayment of the Note. [R. 1822; 2389] 
2. On April 5, 1998, REI and the Lonettis signed a written Agreement modifying 
certain provisions of the Note and increasing the outstanding balance of the Note to 
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$2,167,717.00. The modification contained the following reciprocal attorney's fee 
provision: "If any action is instituted with respect to this Agreement or supporting 
documents, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs 
to be paid by the other parties." [R. 1822-1823; 2389; 2397-2399] 
3. The Lonettis subsequently filed suit against REI to foreclose their Deed of 
Trust and collect the Note. [R. 2084-2085] 
4. The Lonettis and REI thereafter entered into a settlement agreement. Under the 
agreement, at closing the Note was to be reduced by a $250,000.00 payment, the Lonettis 
were to receive personal guarantees of Bilanzich and an REI principal, and the Lonettis 
were to subordinate their Deed of Trust to a maximum $3.5 Million Trust Deed in favor 
of an institutional lender. [R. 1730-1731; 1823]1 
5. On September 20, 1999, REI, the Lonettis and Bilanzich entered into a written 
agreement entitled "Term Sheet". [R. 2083] As part of this agreement, REI was to obtain 
Bilanzich's personal Guaranty of the Note that would be released to the Lonettis at 
closing. The Term Sheet specifically provided that u[t]he closing is contingent on 
financing being obtained by REI from an institutional lender" in the amount of $3.5 
Million. The Term Sheet further provided that "[i]f financing is not obtained, the closing 
1
 Another alternative under the agreement was that REI would pay the Lonettis in 
full at closing. That did not occur. 
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will not occur, all items in escrow will be returned to the party depositing them, and 
Lonetti will foreclose and realize on the security." [R. 1730-1731] 
6. On September 30, 1999, Bilanzich executed a Guaranty of the Note in favor of 
the Lonettis which was deposited in escrow. [R. 2401] 
7. REI never obtained a $3.5 Million loan. Instead, only $300,000.00 was ever 
disbursed by the lender. [R. 1732] Despite that fact, the Bilanzich Guaranty was released 
from escrow. [R. 2084-2085] The Guaranty contained the following attorney's fee 
provision: 
This Guaranty includes all principal, interest, costs, expenses and attorney's 
fees incurred in collection of the Note and in realization of the security. [R. 
2108] 
8. The Lonettis subsequently assigned all their rights with respect to the REI Note 
and Deed of Trust and the Bilanzich Guaranty to JDL. [R. 1734] 
9. REI filed bankruptcy in Nevada. JDL successfully moved for relief from stay 
in that bankruptcy to foreclose its Deed of Trust on the REI property. In connection with 
that motion, John Lonetti testified under oath in his affidavit and Lonettis' counsel argued 
to the bankruptcy court, that the Subordination Agreement the Lonettis had executed 
subordinating to the $3.5 Million loan was not effective because the loan was never fully 
funded. [R. 1732-1734] 
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V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Both the Guaranty and the Note included attorney's fees provisions pursuant to 
which the Lonettis and JDL would have been entitled to recover attorney's fees had they 
prevailed in their attempt to recover from Bilanzich on the Guaranty. Thus, under the 
reciprocal provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5, Bilanzich is entitled to recover 
attorney's fees. 
The fact that Judge Shumate granted summary judgment in favor of Bilanzich 
determining he was not liable on his Guaranty because a condition precedent to 
enforcement of the Guaranty - - funding of the $3.5 Million construction loan - - had not 
occurred does not render the attorney's fees provision unenforceable. Judge Shumate did 
not rescind the Guaranty but only held that the condition precedent had not occurred and, 
therefore, Bilanzich had no liability. Moreover, even if it were assumed that the district 
court's decision had the effect of rescinding or voiding the Guaranty, Bilanzich would 
still be entitled to recover attorney's fees under the reciprocal attorney's fee statute. Both 
Bilanzich's Complaint and the JDL Action were "based upon" a written contract that 
allows at least one party to recover fees. It is not necessary to recovery under this statute 
that the lawsuit seek to enforce a written contract even though the JDL Action did so. 
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VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE GUARANTY CLEARLY CONTAINS AN ATTORNEY'S FEES 
PROVISION. 
Pursuant to the Guaranty, Bilanzich agreed to "absolutely guarantee payment... 
of a Promissory Note" executed by REI with a current principal balance at the time the 
Guaranty was executed of $2 Million. The Guaranty contained the following attorney's 
fees provision: 
This Guaranty includes all principal, interest, costs, expenses, and 
attorney's fees incurred in collection of the Note and realization of the 
security. 
In the court below, the Lonettis and JDL erroneously argued, without any 
supporting authority, that this provision only obligated Bilanzich to pay attorney's fees 
incurred by the Lonettis and JDL in litigating with REI on the Note and did not obligate 
Bilanzich to pay attorney's fees incurred by the Lonettis and JDL in attempting to recover 
on the Note by litigating with Bilanzich to recover on the Guaranty of the Note. 
However, because Bilanzich guaranteed payment of the Note, the attorney's fees incurred 
by JDL in seeking to recover on the Guaranty were in fact fees incurred in collecting the 
Note. Thus, m Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Cardinal Fuels, Inc., 872 F.2d 416, 1989 WL 28404 
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(4 Cir. 1989), the court affirmed a judgment for attorney's fees where the guarantee 
agreement provided that the guarantor would pay "reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
collection of the note." Id. at *2. [Quotation Omitted] 
The Lonettis and JDL clearly understood this fact that they were entitled to recover 
attorney's fees from Bilanzich on the Guaranty if they prevailed. In JDL's complaint 
seeking to recover on the Guaranty, JDL prayed for recovery of attorney's fees. [R. 2501] 
Similarly, in their answer to Bilanzich's claims with respect to the Guaranty, the Lonettis 
prayed for attorney's fees. [R. 85] 
In addition, the Note itself obligated REI to pay attorney's fees incurred by the 
Lonettis in collecting the Note. Thus, REI was liable for any fees incurred to recover on 
the Guaranty of the Note. Because Bilanzich was liable for all of REI's obligations under 
the Note, Bilanzich was also liable for the fees incurred in collecting the Guaranty of the 
Note. Connecticut Nat'I Bank v. Foley, 560 A.2d 475 (Conn. App. 1989) involved this 
very situation. In Foley, the guarantor agreed to pay "any other charges, fees or expenses 
owed by the borrower under the loan agreement." Id. at 478 n.2. The note stated that the 
borrower was obligated to pay "reasonable attorney's fees incurred in collection of all or 
part of his note." Id. at 478. [Quotations Omitted] The court held that because the 
borrower was obligated to pay any attorney's fees incurred in collecting the note, 
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including attorney's fees incurred in collecting on the guarantee of the note, the guarantor 
was likewise obligated to pay such attorney's fees. 
Accordingly, the Guaranty clearly contained an attorney's fee provision which 
would have obligated Bilanzich to pay attorney fees had the Lonettis and JDL prevailed. 
Therefore, as the prevailing party, Bilanzich was entitled to recover his attorney's fees 
under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5, which provides: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails 
in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing executed after April 28, 1986 where the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to 
recover attorney's fees. 
B. THE FACT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND THE GUARANTY 
TO BE UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE THE CONDITION PRECEDENT TO 
LIABILITY HAD NOT OCCURRED DOES NOT DEFEAT BILANZICH1 S 
RIGHT TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Judge Shumate's order denying Bilanzich's motion for attorney's fees and costs 
does not expressly state the basis for the ruling. However, based on his statements at the 
summary judgment hearing and his request for supplemental briefing, Judge Shumate 
presumably denied the motion on the basis that his prior ruling that the Guaranty was 
unenforceable because the condition precedent of REI obtaining a $3.5 Million 
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construction loan had not occurred also rendered the attorney's fees provision 
unenforceable. It is respectfully submitted that this ruling was in error. 
In their supplemental memorandum in opposition to the motion for award of 
attorney's fees, the Lonettis and JDL relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in BLT 
Investment Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978) for their argument that Bilanzich was 
not entitled to recover attorney's fees because the court had determined the Guaranty was 
unenforceable. BLT is clearly distinguishable. 
In BLT, plaintiff sued for specific performance of a contract. The defendant 
sought rescission of the contract. The trial court granted rescission based upon a failure 
of a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the contract and awarded the defendant 
attorney's fees pursuant to a contractual provision. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
rescission order, but reversed the award of attorney's fees. The Court stated that a "party 
may not avoid the contract and, at the same time, claim the benefits of the provision for 
attorney's fees." Id. at 458. 
In the case at bar, Bilanzich did not obtain an order rescinding the contract.2 
Bilanzich's defense did not go to whether the Guaranty contract had been formed and 
Judge Shumate's order did not void that contract. Instead, Bilanzich defended on the 
2
 Bilanzich's rescission claim was dismissed by stipulation of the parties. Cf. 
Bennett v. Baugh, 985 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Or. 1999) (attorneys fees properly awarded 
where defendant sought rescission but judgment did not award it). 
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basis that he had no liability on the Guaranty because a condition precedent to his liability 
had never occurred. The failure of a condition precedent relieves a party of any 
obligation to perform under the contract. [R. 2409; 2421; 2435] Kinsman v. Kinsman, 
748 P.2d 210, 213 (Utah App. 1988); Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 
281 (Utah App. 1987). There is nothing inconsistent with Bilanzich arguing that he had 
no liability under his Guaranty because the $3.5 Million construction loan was never 
obtained and Bilanzich arguing that he is entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred in 
establishing that he has no liability under his Guaranty and defending JDL's claim on the 
Guaranty. Further, BLTwas decided before the enactment of Utah Code Ann. §78-27-
56.5 which does not limit a party's entitlement to attorney fees based upon the nature of 
the claim or defense asserted by the party so long as the lawsuit is based upon a written 
contract which provides for attorney fees. 
Moreover, even if it were assumed for argument that the district court's decision 
had the effect of rescinding or voiding the Guaranty, Bilanzich would still be entitled to 
recover attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5. That statute provides for 
attorney fees to the prevailing party in any action "based upon" a written contract that 
allows at least one party to recover attorney fees. It is not necessary to recovery under 
this statute that the lawsuit be to enforce a written contract. Certainly, JDL's complaint 
for recovery on the Guaranty and Bilanzich's claim for declaratory relief that he was not 
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liable on the Guaranty were civil actions "based upon" a written contract providing for 
attorney's fees. By obtaining a judgment that he was not liable on the Guaranty on the 
basis that the Guaranty was unenforceable because the condition precedent to liability had 
not occurred, Bilanzich was undeniably the prevailing party in a suit based upon the 
written Guaranty. 
InAnglin v. Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc., 2001 UT App. 341, f 11, 37 
P.3d 267, this court recognized that the purpose of this §78-27-56.5 was to "creat[e] a 
level playing field for all parties to a promissory note." See also Hsu v. Abbara, 891 P.2d 
804, 809 (Cal. 1995) (California's reciprocal attorney's fees statute was "enacted to 
establish mutuality of remedy where a contractual provision makes recovery of attorney's 
fees available for only one party, and to prevent oppressive use of one-sided attorney's 
fees provisions"). Had JDL and the Lonettis prevailed, they would have been entitled to 
attorney fees as they alleged in their pleadings. Having defeated their claims, and 
established that he was not liable on the Guaranty, Bilanzich should be awarded his 
attorney's fees to create a level playing field. 
Although Bilanzich has been unable to find any Utah cases directly on point, 
courts in other states have held that attorney's fees were properly awarded under 
reciprocal attorney fee statutes even when rescission of a contract was obtained. 
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In Bovard v. American Horse Enterprises, Inc., 247 Cal. Rptr. 340-346 (Cal. App. 
1988), the court held that under California's reciprocal attorney's fees statute, a party 
prevailing on a claim that a contract is inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable, or non-
existent is entitled to recover attorney's fees if the opposing party would have been 
entitled to recover attorney's fees had it prevailed unless the contract is held 
unenforceable because of illegality. Likewise, in Yuba Cypress Housing Partners, Ltd. v. 
Area Developers, 120 Cal. Rptr.2d 273, 277 (Cal. App. 2002), the court held that a 
plaintiff who successfully voided a contract was nevertheless entitled to recover 
attorney's fees under the attorney's fee provision in the contract. Thus, in Hsu v. Abbara, 
supra, the California Supreme Court stated: 
It is now settled that a party is entitled to attorney's fees under Section 1717 
even when the party prevails on grounds the contract is inapplicable, 
invalid, unenforceable or non-existent if the other party would have been 
entitled to attorney's fees had it prevailed. 891 P.2d at 808 [Quotations and 
Citation Omitted] 
To the same effect, see Carey v. Wallner, 725 P.2d 557, 562 (Mont. 1986) (under 
Montana's reciprocal attorney's fee statute, plaintiff was entitled to recover attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in successfully rescinding a purchase contract); Hackney v. Sunset 
Beach Investments, 644 P.2d 138, 142 (Wash. App. 1982) (the court reversed the trial 
court's refusal to award the purchasers attorney's fees incurred in successfully bringing a 
15 
rescission action under the Washington reciprocal attorney's fees statute which applied to 
"any action on a contract" that provided for attorney's fees).3 
JDL and its sole members, the Lonettis, attempted to recover millions of dollars 
from Bilanzich on his Guaranty. Had they prevailed, they would have been entitled to 
recover the attorney's fees for which they prayed. However, Bilanzich successfully 
proved he was not liable on the Guaranty. Bilanzich is therefore entitled to recover 
attorney's fees under §78-27-56.5. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the order denying 
attorney fees should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions that Bilanzich is 
entitled to an award of his reasonable attorney fees in an amount to be determined by the 
district court. 
3
 The only contrary authority Bilanzich has found is Autolend IAP, Inc. v. Auto 
Depot, Inc., 11 P.3d 693, 697 (Or. App. 2000), in which the court held that Oregon's 
former reciprocal attorney fees statute did not sanction an award of attorney's fees to a 
defendant who successfully proved that a contract did not exist. However, the Oregon 
Legislature later amended the statute in 2001 to make the statute truly reciprocal by 
making it applicable to any suit "in which a claim is made based on a contract." This 
revised statute is more analogous to Utah's statute which permits an award of attorney's 
fees in any action "based upon" a written agreement providing for attorney's fees. 
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DATED this of March, 2005. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
:A->—-
JEFFERSON W. GROSS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE (#0492) 
JEFFERSON W. GROSS (#8339) 
J. RYAN MITCHELL (#9362) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-6677 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL T. BILANZICH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & ) 
McDONOUGH, a professional ; 
corporation, D. WILLIAMS RONNOW, ; 
an individual, REESE'S ENTERPRISES, ; 
INC., a Nevada corporation, JOHN ] 
LONETTI, an individual, EUNES I. ] 
LONETTI, an individual, CAMBRIDGE ] 
CAPITAL GROUP, INC., a Delaware ; 
corporation, CAMBRIDGE HOLDINGS, ; 
INC., a Delaware corporation, JOHN C. ; 
HOWE, an individual, FOOTBRIDGE ; 
LIMITED TRUST, a Bermuda corporation ] 
OLD HILL PARTNERS, a partnership and ; 
DOES IV through X, J 
Defendants. 
> ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY 
1 JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 010500411 
) Judge Shumate 
On November 18, 2003, at 10:30 a.m., Plaintiff Michael T. Bilanzich's ("Bilanzich") 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came on for hearing in the above-entitled Court, the 
i :" 
: L L l 1 J ..ii v.. 
Honorable James L. Shumate presiding. Jefferson W. Gross of Burbidge & Mitchell 
appeared on behalf of Bilanzich; Brent M. Brindley of Durham Jones & Pinegar appeared on 
behalf of Defendants John Lonetti and Eunes Lonetti, and Defendant/Consolidated Case 
Plaintiff JDL Holdings, L.C.; Edwin C. Barnes of Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
appeared on behalf of Defendants D. Williams Ronnow and Jones Waldo Holbrook & 
McDonough; J. Greggory Hardman of Snow Jensen & Reece appeared on behalf Defendants 
Footbridge Limited Trust, Old Hill Partners and John C. Howe; and Mitchell R. Barker 
appeared on behalf of Defendants Cambridge Capital Group, Inc., Cambridge Holdings, 
Inc., and Eric Cummings. 
After considering the arguments of counsel, both written and oral, after considering 
those evidentiary materials submitted by the parties pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e), after 
taking judicial notice of those matters and pleadings filed in In Re Reeses Enterprises, Inc., 
Case No. BK-S-0019134-RCJ in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Nevada, and having considered as true those materials facts identified by Bilanzich in his 
moving papers which were not disputed by Defendants pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration, the Court determines and finds that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact which precludes entry of partial summary judgment as prayed by 
Bilanzich. 
2 
In particular, and among other things, the Court determines that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact as to the non-completion of either Alternative One or Two of the 
September 20, 1999, Term Sheet signed by Bilanzich and Defendants John Lonetti and Eunes 
Lonetti (the "Term Sheet"). The failure of an express condition precedent set forth in the 
Term Sheet renders Bilanzich's written guaranty unenforceable regardless of whether or not 
the guaranty was delivered to Defendants John Lonetti and Eunes Lonetti out of escrow. In 
addition, the affidavit filed by Defendant John Lonetti in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the District of Nevada for the purposes of successfully obtaining leave from the automatic 
bankruptcy stay to foreclose on security is a compelling admission that the express condition 
precedent in the Term Sheet did not occur. 
Accordingly, Bilanzich is granted partial summary judgment in his favor on his Seventh 
Claim for Relief in his Second Amended Complaint and on all claims made against him in the 
Complaint of JDL Holdings, L.C. (Case No. 010501650, which was consolidated with this 
action on November 1, 2001). 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of December, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable James L. Shumate 
Fifth District Court Judge 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the date below written, the undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed 
with all first-class postage pre-paid to: 
Brent M. Brindley 
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR 
192 East 200 North, Third Floor 
P.O. Box 400 
St. George, Utah 84771-0400 
Edwin C. Barnes 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
201 South Main, #1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Ronald C. Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
V. Lowry Snow 
SNOW, JENSEN & REECE 
134 North 200 East, Suite 302 
St. George, Utah 84770 
te. 
DATED this th$ ) day of December, 2003. 
[J\rkQ ftkj jWuaj 
\\Dana\My Documents\MyFiles\Bilanzich\JonesWaldo\Pleadings\OrderGrantingSJ wpd 
4 
ADDENDUM B 
Order deny motion for attorneys fees 
2£'2-f JL'rJ23 F;i f: 0 3 
» 1 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE COU$]Y. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL T BILANZICH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDON, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR_ATTORNEY 
FEES 
Case No: 010500411 
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE 
Date: 06/22/2004 
Clerk: loris 
Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees is Overruled and Denied. 
Hearing of June 29, 2004 is Ordered Stricken. 
mdgfe JAMES L. SHUMA' n 
Page 1 
Case No: 010500411 
Date: Jun 23, 2004 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010500411 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JEFFERSON W GROSS 
ATTORNEY PLA 
215 S STATE ST STE 920 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
84111-2311 
Mail TERRY L WADE 
ATTORNEY DEF 
192 E 200 N 3RD FLOOR 
ST GEORGE UT 84 77 0 
Dated this ^T) day of \jJjJf\jP_, , 2oQL\ . 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 2 (last) 
